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**RESILIENCY AND THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD: HOW THE
NATIONAL GUARD CAN EXPAND ITS ROLE IN DOMESTIC
SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

by

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel V. Scott Arbogast is a U.S. Air National Guard aviator assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1995 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering, and Johns Hopkins University in 2009 with a Masters of Business Administration (MBA). He earned his pilot wings in 1997 and graduated from the Air Force Weapons School in 2002. He has approximately 2,600 flying hours in the F-16 and trainer aircraft. He has served on the NGB Air staff and was a commander of the Air Sovereignty Alert Detachment for the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG).



Abstract

The Air National Guard (ANG), as a component of the National Guard (NG), contains inherent capabilities that can enhance Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations during a disaster response for the Department of Defense. Protection of the United States from terrorism, violent extremism and natural disasters requires synchronization of many local, state and federal government assets and capabilities. Yet, waiting seventy-two hours for federal manpower makes it clear that the majority of life saving resources should already be in place at the local level. If a military force is required, the NG logically should act in coordination with civil authorities as the first responders instead of (or at least prior to) using a federal force.

The current NG ground response for DSCA operations are mainly comprised of Army National Guard (ARNG) forces in the form of Weapon of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages and the Homeland Response Force. Although the ANG maintains a minor role in each of these ground response teams, adjustments are required to create a more effective, resilient NG force for DSCA operations. This paper defines the current NG response, addresses some limitations of the Stafford Act, discusses command and control options for DOD forces, and concludes with recommendations to expand the ANG's role.

A more engaged and resilient ANG homeland defense response force begins with updating equipment, education, training and exercises to re-balance the ANG and meet the requirements stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. There is the potential to leverage 106,700 ANG airmen across 3,300 communities in the United States to perform DSCA, far beyond what is currently expected. The steps recommended in this paper can create a more resilient and prepared ANG force for DSCA operations.

Introduction

The aftermath of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident could have grave consequences with massive casualties; such a disaster will quickly overwhelm first responders. In 2007, the RAND Corporation produced a lessons learned paper on Hurricane Katrina; part of this document contained a list of future possible disasters that describe the expected levels of destruction including fatalities, infrastructure damage and number of expected evacuations.¹ These types of disasters are commonly referred to as meta-scenarios. This list (see Appendix 1) highlights the difficult challenge civilian first responders will face. Given any of these meta-scenarios, President Obama stated that state governors would need to wait up to seventy-two hours for a federal response. The National Guard (NG) has resources that can fill this void to aid civil authorities within and beyond the seventy-two hour time frame. The NG has a dual role- it supplements federal forces for the nation's wars abroad and provides for the safety and security of the fifty-four states, territories and the District of Columbia. The Air National Guard (ANG), as a component of the NG, provides unique capabilities to aid emergency response efforts. However, adjustments are required. This paper will argue that the ANG should enhance its Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) education and training programs, develop a plan for cross-utilizing airmen based upon Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) type, and develop a more robust exercise and evaluation program to expand its role in homeland defense.

As one war ends in Iraq and another draws down in Afghanistan, the U.S. economy remains in dire need of attention as the costs of both wars total nearly 1 trillion dollars. This will come at the expense of future military budgets and force senior leaders to make difficult choices about where to focus future investments. An alternative to these difficult choices exists with an expanded role for the ANG. This paper will address the current role of the NG in homeland

defense, the implications of the Stafford Act, entitlements and authorities and the command structure for state led NG response forces. It also addresses the capabilities, strengths, and legal implications of an NG response while offering recommendations on how to create a more effective ANG force.

National Guard Domestic Operations

Domestic operations for the NG include Homeland Defense and the NG Civil Support mission.² The Homeland Defense Mission aims to deter, deny and detect threats to the CONUS; the NG Civil Support mission provides additional expertise and capacity for the existing civil authorities. The ANG plays a predominant role in the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) and Mobility/Air Refueling Operations in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), a contingency operation developed post September 11, 2001 to protect America's airspace from aviation threats. At first glance one sees that the ANG primary role in homeland defense is dictated by its federally procured air assets. Although thousands of airmen from pilots, maintainers, and support personnel produce sorties in support of homeland defense, this paper will focus on the civil support and ground response functions. Appendix 2 provides a visual depiction of how NG assets are employed under state control; it also depicts what follow-on capabilities arrive from federal forces after seventy-two hours. It is interesting to note that the Army National Guard (ARNG) provides the preponderance of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) forces comprised of Weapons of Mass Destructive Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), CBRN Enhanced Response Force Package (CERF-P) and Homeland Response Force (HRF).

WMD - Civil Support Team

The WMD-CST is a state controlled federally funded team of NG personnel that are able to identify CBRN substances in support of local and state agencies. Each team has twenty-two full

time Title 32 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel comprised of both Air and Army National Guard that are divided into six sections: Command, Operations, Communications, Administration, Medical and Survey. The idea of a Civil Support Team (CST) originated with Secretary of Defense William Cohen in the late 1990's.³ There are fifty-seven CSTs located throughout the U.S. states, territories and the District of Columbia.⁴ These CSTs are under their respective governor and are deployable within a few hours. This highly trained force acts as the NG's lead element and provides a rapid response capability to identify potential CBRN agents, advise and assist civil authorities, and affect the bed-down of follow-on military forces. Originally created for CBRN events, the National Defense Authorization Act (2007) allowed governors to use their CST's for any natural or manmade disaster. As an example, the Alabama NG CST used their expertise and equipment to stand up an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tuscaloosa, AL after the local emergency agency command center was destroyed during the tornadoes that ravaged the city in 2011.⁵ This legislation has made the CST more useable, accessible asset for the state given the likelihood of natural disasters.

CBRN Enhanced Response Force Package

The CERF-P consists of the following elements: command and control (C2), search and extraction, decontamination, medical and fatality search and recovery teams. There are currently seventeen CERF-P units authorized by Congress that deploy within six to twelve hours as an immediate response capability for any state emergency. Unlike the CST, the CERF-P team is a scalable force of approximately 186 personnel that augment a local response with additional capability to aid in search and extraction, personnel and equipment decontamination, and emergency medical response. The ANG role in the CERF-P is typically limited to the medical and recovery elements, while the other functions are normally comprised of ARNG personnel.

CERF-P teams are deployed at the discretion of the affected governor, normally upon the recommendation of the state Adjutant General (TAG) through the state's respective Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). The 17 CERF-P units are able to operate across state lines through the Emergency Mutual Aid Compact (EMAC). The intent is to facilitate the concept of governors helping governors and aid the response effort when disasters affect multiple states.

Homeland Response Force

Each of the ten planned HRFs consists of approximately 570 personnel that retain many of the same competencies as the CERF-P concept, but with a more substantial C2 and organic security capabilities that are primarily ARNG. There are currently two certified HRFs. By the end of 2012, a HRF unit will be placed within the 10 FEMA regions to create a rapid response, all-hazards homeland security task force. The HRFs have a six to twelve hour response time and are equipped to deploy either by ground or air transport. The HRFs consist of a medical team, search and extraction team, decontamination team, security team and C2 team. The HRFs operate under state control and deploy across state lines under EMAC. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report directed that NG HRFs provide the foundation for a more flexible consequence management response.⁶ However, the Department of Defense has yet to provide adequate budgeting mechanisms to allow for the planning, training and exercising capability to properly link federal, state and local authorities.

Stafford Act

A governor may request federal assistance from the President when their state and local resources are overwhelmed by a disaster. The federal government provides resources in the form of funding, personnel, and critical services once the President formally makes an emergency or major disaster declaration. A major disaster declaration differs from an emergency declaration in

that it provides avenues for more long term federal support to the state. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) was enacted by Congress in 1974. The Stafford Act is the principal legislation that governs the federal response to disasters in the United States. This legislation has undergone a series of amendments over the past thirty-seven years. In 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act expanded FEMA's authority to provide assistance for pre-disaster preparations.⁷

FEMA is the Primary Agency (PA) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for federal disaster response. The FEMA Administrator advises the President, who ultimately determines the assistance needs for states, local governments and individuals during a major disaster or emergency declaration.⁸ Congress is concerned about the many amendments to the Stafford Act where the competing priorities of controlling cost and providing aid often raises questions.⁹ A recent Congressional Research review argues that politics sometimes determine whether a state will or will not obtain the declaration from the President. One senior FEMA employee stated that this may also impact a governor's decision to ask for federal assistance.¹⁰ Many states face severe budget constraints and the Stafford Act often incentivizes states to tap into federal funds and DOD assistance before exhausting their own resources, including the NG. Furthermore, lessons from Hurricane Katrina created incentives for FEMA to act before states exhaust local resources in an effort to demonstrate a strong federal response. This shines light on the politics and potential loop holes involved in the Stafford Act. The NG operating on State Active Duty (SAD) orders is an expensive proposition for a governor depending on the nature of the disaster. If the situation does not reach a level that FEMA would reimburse a state response, governors may be reluctant to mobilize the NG. In essence then, federal assistance may actually act as a disincentive for a governor to use his or her own assets, e.g. the NG. Exacerbating this

issue, all State Coordinating Officers (SCOs) do not necessarily receive the same level of advice on their organic NG capabilities and availability which can cause an over reliance on federal assistance.¹¹

Title 32, State Active Duty and Title 10

The dual role capability of the NG means that the states' soldiers and airmen can perform duty either in a state or federal status each defined by federal and state laws. It is critical to understand the implications of each status for Command and Control (C2), legal implications, and entitlements. Appendix 2 offers a quick overview on who retains C2, what entity funds the NG and which missions may be accomplished under each of the three statutes. The ANG's federal mission is to organize, train and equip units for mobilization during national emergencies. In peace-time these combat and support units are assigned to different Air Force Major Commands for training, readiness and contingency operations (e.g. Operation New Dawn). Unless ordered to federal service under Title 10 of the U.S. code (such as a mobilization), the Guardsmen will reside in a Title 32 or SAD status under the state chain of command where the governor acts as the commander-in-chief. In terms of pay and entitlements, Title 32 Guardsmen are paid from federal funds, while SAD members are paid from state funds. Guardsmen operating on Title 32 orders are either training for a federal mission or executing a federal operational mission such as ONE or a counterdrug mission.¹² A full representation of all of the legal ramifications of each individual pay status is beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are some important distinctions to highlight.

First, the decision of the governor to call up the NG has major financial implications for the state and therefore, might act as a disincentive for him or her to use the NG. The governor typically views the NG as a state strategic asset and will often rely on the advice of the TAG to

determine when to use the force. There are many full-time Title 32 AGRs that provide a limited domestic response capability to the state because of fiscal law and Anti-Deficiency Act implications.¹³ Emergency and immediate situations are discussed within ANGI 36-101 which states that any full-time AGR airman can be used if they also will perform their normal AGR duties.¹⁴ If the duty requested is outside of their area of expertise (e.g. using a pilot to lead a security detail), then the Title 32 full time AGR can only be used for domestic operations under the immediate response authority delineated in DODD 3025.18. This partly explains why more ARNG are utilized over ANG personnel.

The ANG, while smaller than the ARNG, has proportionally more full-time Title 32 personnel because of the specialization requirements within the service. Therefore, in a domestic emergency it is easier to activate a Traditional (Part-time) Army guardsman to Title 32 or SAD instead of employing a full-time Title 32 airman. However, this also depends on the construct of each respective state's NG force. Regardless of this fact, a meta-scenario would create a situation where all forces are required. There needs to be an easier mechanism in place to utilize Air and Army National Guardsmen for these situations.

Command and Control

State, Parallel, Dual-status and Federal are the four options available for the command of NG forces during a homeland defense domestic response. Assuming a disaster response reaches the state level, the governor retains the authority to activate his or her NG forces under state active duty (SAD) or a Title 32 status. These state missions may include the forces already cited. The governor can also leverage their state's Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) through the TAG to provide C2 over the governor's NG forces. The JFHQ will tailor a Joint Task Force (JTF) and assume tactical control over NG units that respond to the emergency relief efforts.¹⁵ Flood relief,

humanitarian assistance, wild-fire control, and snow storms are examples when the NG is utilized by their governor. A governor has a wide range of responsibilities to protect critical infrastructure, constituents, and property. It should be noted that National Guardsmen on SAD or Title 32 authorities are not subject to the limitations imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. Specifically, such forces are able to perform certain law enforcement activities that Title 10 forces cannot execute.

Parallel Command is the second option. This involves federal forces under Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and state NG forces operating in concert under the state command structure listed above.¹⁶ NORTHCOM was established for homeland defense of the CONUS and acts as the lead agency that coordinates federal military support to civilian authorities. The federal forces supplied by the DOD operate under Title 10 and have no authority over the state NG forces, unless there is a dual status commander or all forces are federalized. The Dual status command structure allows a governor to order a Title 32 NG commander to federal active duty (Title 10) which authorizes the NG commander to control federal and state forces concurrently.¹⁷ This allows for unity of command, keeps the governor in control of the response, and integrates federal forces better than the Parallel Command structure. According to the National Response Framework (NRF), maintaining close coordination by federal military, NG and other DOD elements is critical during any response effort.¹⁸ Under the Federal Command option all forces, NG and Active, operating under Title 10 and are under the control of the President as Commander-in-Chief. This control is often delegated down to the NORTHCOM/CC. A meta-scenario involving a massive amount of casualties and destruction (e.g. a nuclear attack) would likely involve the Federal Command option, although the Dual Status Command may also be utilized if the disaster was collocated within the borders of one state.

Evolving Role?

During the 2010 Tuscaloosa tornado disaster, Governor Robert Bentley activated 1,000 Alabama National Guardsmen to aid the civilian first response efforts. As described earlier, Tuscaloosa's EOC was decimated from the tornadoes and the Alabama NG CST immediately established an EOC to aid in the response.¹⁹ At the direction of the mayor and the incident commander, the NG performed security operations to protect the disaster area from looters. The civilian local police were overwhelmed by the event and the NG provided immediate law enforcement activities throughout Tuscaloosa to secure the area. Mayor Walter Maddox (Tuscaloosa) praised the Alabama NG's ability to quickly establish security details across twenty-eight intersections across the city.²⁰ The mayor also cited the distinguished manner in which the Alabama NG executed their mission with compassion and empathy towards the citizens of Tuscaloosa. He described the event as "Alabamians helping Alabamians" with the NG augmenting civil authorities in a manner that allowed other civilian responders to deal with more vital processes and procedures during this crisis.²¹

A response from citizen soldiers that live in and around the community logically offers an additional level of compassion beyond what a Federal response force would likely provide. The Tuscaloosa disaster is an example of the effective use of the NG that not only augments civilian capacity, but also acts as a tangible symbol of state control over the response. A common concern is that citizens will not want armed U.S. forces patrolling the streets during a disaster response. Mayor Maddox stated the opposite was true in Tuscaloosa as he described how elated citizens were to see the Alabama NG in Tuscaloosa.²²

Recommendations

When it comes to the ANG role in Homeland Defense there are many core skills and capabilities that should be leveraged when planning for disaster response, especially in a CBRN environment. Pre-deployment preparation training for all airmen utilizes a four tiered method, mandated by the AF and determines the type of training required for deployment. For example, airmen deploying to the Middle East are required to complete Self-Aid Buddy Care (SABC), CBRN and Combat Skills training, all of which also apply to a domestic response. According to AFI 10-2501, all AF members are required to accomplish CBRN Defense Awareness and CBRN Defense Survival Skills prior to deploying to any Medium or High Threat Area. This training must be accomplished every two years for the airman to remain in a deployable status.²³

Most training is accomplished from a web based source, such as the Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS), while some of it is accomplished in a “hands on” fashion. The point is to not re-state requirements, but establish a source of pre-existing capability that directly applies to educating airmen in homeland defense. How many deployed airmen already trained in CBRN and SABC will be called upon by their state to perform these life-saving competencies in a domestic disaster? The regulations, structure, courses and instructors already exist in the NG for deployed scenarios. Yet, there is no current NG guidance that translates these same requirements to homeland defense. Many of the NG’s daily training activities already provide expertise in areas that are useful to DSCA. Even airmen that train in specialized career fields already retain a basic capability that can be leveraged for domestic operations.

Enhancement

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) should identify and implement a template of homeland defense cross-training based on pre-existing course material. One of the challenges of templates for the NG is that missions, resources, equipment and training vary by state. In terms of

equipment, the NG has leveraged pre-existing equipment and identified future requirements by transforming its Essential 10- Domestic Operations concept into the Emergency Support Function (ESF) construct.²⁴ This ANG Domestic Operations Equipment Requirements (DOERs) book defines ANG capability and shortfalls within the ESF construct. It documents what ANG equipment is available to the state and FEMA regions. The book identifies which ESF items are “critical” for procurement because of ANG shortfalls and based upon eight threat scenarios. The ANG is working with Congress to earmark what they can to build equipment capacity each fiscal year.

This same logic should also be applied to training requirements for NG airmen. When a disaster occurs each airmen should know their roles, expected missions and how they will be employed. The NGB recently theoretically matched ANG Unit Type Codes (UTCs) to FEMA core capability shortfalls. An analysis made by a senior technical advisor on NG Civil Support identified 39,611 airmen (37% of ANG end strength of 106,700) who are already matched to 13 core capabilities that FEMA identified as critical; this same study identified another 79,520 ANG positions that directly support 13 out of the 15 ESFs of the National Response Framework (NRF) with minimal additional training.²⁵ A chart of this analysis, matching ANG UTCs to FEMA capabilities, is provided in Appendix 4. Although this chart provides a snap shot of the potential civil support of the entire ANG, it does not correctly address the capabilities and limitations within each state, district or territory.

Another problem is that overseas deployment rotations also impact the availability of the NG forces. Additional EMAC agreements and detailed planning that matches each wing’s capabilities to individual states or FEMA regions is the next logical step in defining a future ANG response plan. This will involve an understanding of each state’s capabilities and

limitations. The JFHQs should lead this effort and work with the NGB to develop templates that meets the individual needs of the states and or FEMA region. Another challenge is translating ANG capabilities and structure into the NRF and National Incident Management System (NIMS). NRF and NIMS formulates the framework, doctrine and structure as to how civilian agencies develop their emergency response plans.

Education

There are already AF courses and regulations available that translate Air Force Incident Management Procedures (AFIMS) into the NRF and NIMS system. The AF developed the AF Emergency Response Operations Command and Control (AERO C2) training to meet FEMA training requirements mandated by NIMS. When an airman accomplishes this training available on ADLS, he or she receives credit for FEMA training courses 100, 200, 700 & 800.²⁶ Many of these FEMA training courses are also web based. The AERO courses are used by the AF for their Disaster Response Force (DRF) members that provide C2 functions for DSCA operations when a federal response is required. The DRF Federal response sequence is depicted in Appendix 2. The AERO C2 and other advanced AERO courses can be modified to train ANG airmen on the NRF and NIMS concept of operations. The next step for the NG is to determine the cross-training requirements for airmen based on the ESF concept.

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations, is a regulation that specifies how the AF responds to all hazards. This AFI provides guidance, roles and policies to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from threats.²⁷ Although this AFI provides excellent guidance and procedures for installation commanders, it does not address how military forces integrate into a pre-existing state response outside the jurisdiction of the installation. However, it still provides a foundation for training

and procedures that the NGB can use to specify training requirements. For example, some ANG pilots or operators may be more qualified to fill in the C2 and coordination FEMA Core capability. These operators may only require the AERO C2 ADLS training for immediate utilization in a state EOC. ANG maintainers cross-trained to perform security details may not need training on the NRF and NIMS system, yet they will need additional skills training to perform the Safe and Secure Environment FEMA core capability. The details involved in matching AFSCs to each FEMA core capability are beyond the scope of this paper; yet the potential to leverage pre-existing professional NG forces with minimal additional training is the next step in the process.

The NGB Staff are logically the ones who should develop a training template based on AFSCs matched to FEMA core capabilities. Once developed, each state's JFHQ can then determine how to best implement the training based on their respective state's emergency response plans. There is no easy solution, but if the NG wants to take the lead on homeland defense and fill the void of a federal response within the first seventy-two hours, then it needs to work with each state or FEMA region to determine how to effectively educate and train their guardsmen for the response.

Training and Inspections

A common criticism for many airmen across the Total Force is the difficulty in meeting the demands of inspection cycles while maintaining their respective AEF deployment schedule. The Total Force all feel the strain of the wars overseas and it often leaves little time for wings to reconstitute before another deployment or inspection. In terms of readiness the Phase 1 and Phase 2 Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs) are just one of the many tools the AF utilizes to evaluate a wing's combat effectiveness and readiness. Although the AF has updated the

scenarios to stay relevant with current threats, much of a Phase 2 ORI still resembles a Cold War adversary with the intention of effectively testing a Wing's Designed Operational Capability (DOC) and CBRN response. Although these scenarios may not change, one recommendation is to adjust the scenarios for NG Wings to include a homeland defense response.

The idea would be to evaluate the "within seventy-two hour response capability" of the NG by testing the integration with civilian authorities and the execution of the local emergency response plan. Integration of these multiple agencies into an effective response is arguably the most challenging aspect for planning and execution. Exercises and inspections, like OREs and ORIs, provide a potential opportunity to train for these missions. These inspections and preparation for inspections force wings to train in emergency response planning and execution. Although the integration with civil agencies could be difficult, it would require a major adjustment to the current inspection model. In addition, many of the same critical CBRN, SABC, and C2 skills could still be evaluated with an adjusted scenario. There are also other civilian training opportunities as well as National Level Exercises (NLE) that can and should be leveraged to further enhance the NGs homeland defense capabilities.

Public Resiliency

FEMA is employing an all-of-nation whole community approach to integrate federal, state, local governments with private sector, community and individual partner capabilities for disaster preparedness based on Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) – 8.²⁸ The whole community concept leverages all existing resources to create resiliency. Arguably the best way to develop resiliency is to educate all civilians on how to prepare, respond and survive during a meta-scenario. So far, the FEMA and DHS solution to educating the public is to place information on their website. Although the Internet is a valuable tool, FEMA needs to establish a more effective education

plan. Part of the solution might be the NG and all CONUS forces. The NG is already spread across 3,300 communities across the U.S. Public education could happen in a variety of different forums to include public school visits, local and city free education seminars, education during air show events or base open houses. The NG is already embedded in their local communities and leveraging education with pre-existing local, community relationships could be a powerful way to create resiliency.

Conclusion

Any number of meta-scenario disaster events as listed in Appendix 1 will quickly overwhelm many local and state civil authorities. The number of casualties, survivors that require medical treatment, and destruction caused by such a disaster would require many forms of federal assistance. Yet, waiting seventy-two hours for federal manpower makes it clear that the majority of life saving resources need to be already in place at the local level. This paper highlighted the current NG ground response capabilities in the forms of WMD-CST, CERF-P and HRF which all augment, but do not replace the state's response. Activation of the NG forces under SAD is a strategic asset for the governor, although a very expensive one. A governor may be reluctant to activate the NG because of the fiscal incentives involved within the Stafford Act. State fiscal constraints may also cause a governor to hesitate to use his or her own NG forces which could delay the response until federal forces arrive.

The NRF is based on a bottom-up approach, starting with local and state responders under the governor. If a military force is required, the NG logically should act in coordination with civil authorities as the first responders instead of (or at least prior to) using a federal force. In this scenario with pre-existing NG forces augmenting federal forces, the Dual Status Command structure is the best option to achieve unity of effort. Unlike Title 10 forces, the NG forces


utilized under SAD or Title 32 are not limited by Posse Comitatus allowing them to augment law enforcement. A more engaged and resilient ANG homeland defense response force begins with updating equipment, education, training and exercises to meet the needs of this larger role.

The pre-deployment regulation requirements already educate NG soldiers and airmen on how to fight and survive in the CBRN environment. These education tools should be restructured to meet the education needs of soldiers and airmen for homeland defense missions. In addition, the NGB should work with each respective JFHQ to determine cross-utilization training requirements for their airmen based on state capabilities and shortfalls. Many airmen's AFSCs are so specialized that their core skills may not be directly transferable to homeland defense. However, a minimal amount of cross-utilization training can change them into an effective force for civilian first responders. Thus, a "one size fits all" NGB template is not the answer. The state's JFHQ needs to aid in developing the right solution for cross-utilization and training. The AF should also consider updating their ORI scenarios for NG wings to be able to evaluate and exercise in the homeland defense environment. The ORIs dictate a level of commitment in terms of exercising and resources that are invaluable to homeland defense by adjusting the scenarios. The NG can also augment FEMA's public education efforts for disaster response. If the ANG is serious about expanding their role, it will make these adjustments and leverage the 106,700 airmen in support of homeland defense. As the fiscal realities and the military cuts begin, it will be interesting if the DOD actually is prepared to "provide appropriate support to civil authorities" during a domestic disaster, as stated in the 2010 QDR report. The recommendations provided here are a step in the right direction.


Appendix 1 - Hurricane Katrina Destruction for Future Scenarios²⁹

Hurricane Katrina's Destruction and Requirements Look Similar to What the Country Might Face in Future Scenarios						
	Hurricane Katrina	Radiological Attack	Nuclear Detonation	Biological Attack: Anthrax	Biological Attack: Plague	Natural Disaster: Major Earthquake
Scenario	A large hurricane hits the Gulf Coast; a storm surge floods 80 percent of New Orleans	A dirty bomb containing cesium-137 is detonated in a moderate-to-large city	A 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device is detonated in the business district of a large city	Aerosolized anthrax is released in a major urban area	Pneumonic plague bacteria is released in 3 main areas of a major city	An earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale hits a major metropolitan area and is followed by an 8.0 aftershock
DESTRUCTION						
Fatalities	1,349	180	Widely variable; possibly tens of thousands	13,000	2,500	1,400
Infrastructure	93,000 square miles	Transportation severely hampered by checkpoints; extensive contamination of about 36 city blocks	Total destruction within a radius of 0.5 to 1 mile; significant damage in a larger area	Minimal damage	No damage	150,000 buildings destroyed, 1 million damaged; significant transportation disruptions
Utilities	2.5 million without power	Some damage near the explosion	Electrical power and telecommunications out for a couple of weeks; damaged in 3-mile radius	Minimal damage	No damage	Widespread water, gas, electricity, and communication outages
REQUIREMENTS						
Evacuations	2,000,000	Downwind populations	450,000 or more	Possibly	Possibly	300,000 households
Medical	Casualty care	Screening and decontaminating thousands of evacuees	Decontamination and short- and long-term care for tens of thousands	Care for over 325,000 exposures	Care for over 10,000 ill victims	Over 100,000 injuries and 18,000 hospitalizations; many medical facilities damaged
SOURCE: Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, 2007.						

Appendix 2 - National Guard and Federal Response Organizations³⁰



Appendix 3 – National Guard Status and Control³¹

			
	<u>State Active Duty</u>	<u>Title 32</u>	<u>Title 10</u>
Command & Control	Governor	Governor	President
Where	Within State or State to State	United States	United States and Global
Pay	State	Federal	Federal
Mission types	Specialized Medical Care, Mortuary Affairs, Open the Base, Law Enforcement, Aerial Port, Cyber Ops, Logistics Readiness Centers, Urban Search & Rescue, Air Traffic Control, Aeromedical Evacuation, Airlift Coordination, Communications, Heavy Construction, Structural Construction, Consequence Management, Disaster Relief Bed-down Sites, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, IAA, Common Operating Picture, and Information Assurance and Awareness (IAA).	Specialized Medical Care, Mortuary Affairs, Open the Base, Law Enforcement, Aerial Port, Cyber Ops, Logistics Readiness Centers, Urban Search & Rescue, Air Traffic Control, Aeromedical Evacuation, Airlift Coordination, Communications, Heavy Construction, Structural Construction, Consequence Management, Disaster Relief Bed-down Sites, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, IAA, Common Operating Picture, and Information and Assurance and Awareness (IAA).	Air Defense, Tactical Airlift, Combat Communications, Specialized Medical Care, Mortuary Affairs, Open the Base, Aerial Port, Cyber Ops, Logistics Readiness Centers, Urban Search & Rescue, Air Traffic Control, Aeromedical Evacuation, Airlift Coordination, Communications, Heavy Construction, Structural Construction, Consequence Management, Disaster Relief Bed-down Sites, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, IAA, Common Operating Picture, and Information Assessment and Assurance (IAA)

Appendix 4 - ANG UTCs matching to FEMA Core Capabilities³²

FEMA Core Capability	# of UTCs Matching	# of ANG Personnel Matching	% of ANG Total Matching Capability	DANG DOERs Priority	ANG SPS Priority	ANG FAM Priority
Situational Assessment	71	2875	7%	#3	#6	YES
Public Messaging	4	621	2%	#2	#2	YES
Command, Control & Coordination	59	4608	12%	#2 & #3	#2	YES
Critical Communications	24	1745	5%	#2	#2	YES
Safe & Secure Environment	19	7088	18%	#1	#5	YES
Search & Rescue	13	2358	6%	#4	#3	YES
Health & Medical Treatment	29	5933	15%	#4	#3	YES
Critical Transportation	81	9560	24%	#1	#1	YES
Emergency Shelter	15	2200	6%	#1		YES
Stabilize Infrastructure	37	2636	7%	#1	#4	YES
Recovery/Temporary Storage of Deceased	2	187	.5%	#4	#3	YES
Essential Services & Commodities	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
TOTAL ANG Matching FEMA Core Capabilities	354	39,611				
<i>The highest priority operations critical to stabilizing the site and situation within 72 hours, with a primary focus on saving and sustaining lives</i>						

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